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I. LEGAL DISTINCTIONS ENABLING WESTERN STATES
ON THE ENERGY FUTURE
All fifty U.S. states are not legally equal on energy options. The Western
states are different from others in three notable regards, when assessing
the possibilities and tools available to dictate their future energy landscapes.
That future will not be based as much on traditional fossil fuel use.
There will be a transition to more use of renewable energy, such that the
majority of future electric power additions will be comprised of renewable
energy.1 For context, fossil fuels are transportable within the U.S.—either
by pipeline or surface transport. Renewable energy is fixed in place and
in its raw form is not transportable like fossil fuels.
How are Western states distinct? First, the Western states are distinctive
in their energy resources and renewable energy potential. Even more unique
and most importantly, the Western states have both substantial baseload
renewable resources comprised of hydro and geothermal resources, as

1. Ehren Goossens, Renewable Energy Expected to Draw Bulk of Spending for
New Power Plants, [2015] ENVTL. L. REP. (BNA) No. 120, at 15 (June 23, 2015) (“Renewable
energy will absorb almost two-thirds of the spending on new power plants over the next
25 years, dwarfing spending on fossil fuels,” as solar energy becomes the first choice for
consumers); Roy L. Hales, ⅔ of New US Electricity Capacity Was From Wind In October,
CLEAN TECHNICA (Nov. 24, 2014), http://cleantechnica.com/2014/11/24/two-thirds-of
us-installations-were-from-the-wind-sector/ [https://perma.cc/W6GY-SN6C] (Wind was
the predominant new power generation source added since 2014); Global Renewable
Energy Market Outlook, BLOOMBERG NEW ENERGY FIN. (Nov. 16, 2011) http://bnef.com/
WhitePapers/download/53.688 [https://perma.cc/XUX5-3ZGH] (explaining that the global
market for renewable energy is projected to grow to $460 billion per year by 2030).
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well as excellent intermittent renewable solar and wind resources.2 This
distinguishes the technical energy profile of the West. Section II addresses
how the Western states are different than the rest of the nation in future
renewable energy possibilities. The Section examines greenhouse gas
emissions in the Western states compared to other states, then adjusts this
data in two important regards: for per capita energy consumption, and
thereafter to examine the net electricity flow into and out of the West’s
most populous state, California.
Second, with regard to law, it is important to note that not all federal
circuit courts interpret the Constitution consistently, and there is no
requirement that they do so. While the Supreme Court, in theory, can impose
a unified constitutional interpretation on all federal courts, such unification is
less present than one might assume. The Supreme Court grants certiorari
for review at its discretion and hears and decides very few cases. Even
when the Supreme Court renders a decision, the circuit courts have found
ways to circumvent the Supreme Court. For example, after a most watched
2007 unanimous decision of the Supreme Court which reversedholdings
of every circuit court in the country, several circuit courts have since
interpreted the law differently than the Supreme Court opinion indicated
was the purpose of their decision.3
Federal circuit court geography matters. Nine Western states are with
the Ninth Federal Circuit Court of Appeals.4 This is the most extensive
federal circuit court in the country, covering a huge land area unrivaled
among the 12 federal circuit courts, including the 9 most Western states:
California, Oregon, Washington Alaska, Hawaii, Nevada, Arizona, Idaho,
and Montana. See Figure 1. Nine states are more than double the four states
covered by the typical federal circuit court, and they are large Western
states. The Western states in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals include the
only two states in the U.S. whose electric power sectors are not covered
by the federal Dormant Commerce Clause of the Constitution because
they do not engage in interstate electric commerce—Alaska and Hawaii.
Section III examines how the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals with
jurisdiction over the nine Western states, has twice, for two different state
2. See infra Section II.
3. Steven Ferrey, The Superfund Cost Allocation Liability Conflicts Among the
Federal Courts, 11 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 249, 273–76 (2009); Steven Ferrey, Toxic “Plain
Meaning” and “Moonshadow”: Supreme Court Unanimity and Unexpected Consequences, 24
VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 5–6 (2013).
4. See infra Figure 1.
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energy programs, issued opinions which are contrary to every other circuit
court in the country which has rendered an opinion on the issue, as well
as at some odds with decisions of the Supreme Court.5 However, the
Supreme Court denied certiorari to review this matter, presumably because
at the time there was no split regarding the particular renewable liquid fuel
matter at issue in the circuit courts. These Ninth Circuit decisions have
positioned California and Oregon, whose respective statutes were the
subjects of these constitutional challenges, as well as the other states in the
Ninth Circuit, with much freer regulatory discretion than other states outside
the West and outside the Ninth Circuit. As a result, Western states can
experiment in their energy regulation, untethered by the same constitutional
concerns visited upon states in other parts of the country. Section III examines
this distinct opinion of the Ninth Circuit, as well as a pivotal opinion of the
Supreme Court in 2016.
FIGURE 1

Source: http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/images/CircuitMap.pdf [https://perma.
cc/Z33U-5XQN].

5. Steven Ferrey, Can the Ninth Circuit Overrule the Supreme Court on the
Constitution?, 93 NEB. L. REV. 807, 847–56 (2015).
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Section IV pivots to compare recent decisions of other federal circuit
courts on state authority over energy policy and contrasts how these other
circuits are distinguishable from the Ninth Circuit and Western states.
Highlighted in Section IV are 2016 decisions of the Seventh and Eighth
Circuits, as well as a decision of the Second Circuit, all restricting nonWestern state jurisdiction over energy. Section V highlights how the Western
states are distinct legally and technically with regard to climate change
regulation and the transition to more renewable power. The U.S. will be
deploying substantially more renewable electric power. Much of this is
incentivized by the states, rather than by the federal government, through
net metering, carbon emission policies, and renewable portfolio standards.6
Each of the 41 states is very different in its net metering policy,7 nine states
in its carbon emission policy,8 and 29 states in its renewable portfolio
standards.9 Section V examines how two Western states are legally promoting
renewable energy with recent notable changes in policy.
II. WESTERN STATE DISTINCTIONS IN ENERGY FLOW, GHG IMPACTS,
AND POTENTIAL FUTURE ENERGY DEVELOPMENT OPTIONS
A. GHG Emissions in Western States
We start by contrasting global warming issues in the Western U.S. compared
to the rest of the U.S. Produced by Purdue University in 2008, Figure 2
shows more greenhouse gas emissions coming from the Eastern U.S.10 In
this map, the darker red, orange, and yellow shadings reveal the more intense
levels of GHG emissions by region at the time the data was collected,
approximately 7 years ago. This paints a picture of much less contribution
to climate change emanating from the Western states, with the limited
exception of a few population centers on the West coast in California, Oregon,
and Washington.

6. Steven Ferrey, California Challenges & Vulnerabilities of the New Business Model
Design for Power, 6 SAN DIEGO J. CLIMATE & ENERGY L. 1, 12 (2014–15).
7. Id. at 15.
8. Id. at 24.
9. Id. at 17.
10. Mac McClelland, East Coast/West Coast Energy: The #$%* Is On!, MOTHER
JONES (May-Jun. 2008), http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2008/05/east-coastwest
coast-energy [https://perma.cc/9D3J-E2WN].
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FIGURE 2
TOTAL CARBON DIOXIDE EMISSIONS
IN THE UNITED STATES, 2008

Source: https://news.uns.purdue.edu/x/2008a/080407GurneyVulcan.html [https://perma.
cc/GH59-FGSV].

However, this is only one way to interpret the same data. GHG emissions,
aside from water vapor in the atmosphere, do not appear naturally. They
are significantly related to population. The two primary anthropomorphic
sources of GHGs, CO2 and CH4 (methane), are a function of human use
of energy to power modern society. Figure 3 shows the increase of CO2,
responsible for the majority of GHG emissions , over the past one thousand
years.GHG emissions are directly correlated with population growth, and
with the use of fossil fuel energy in approximately the last 200 years for
electricity production and other industrial and building heating applications.

134

FERREY (DO NOT DELETE)

[VOL. 8: 129, 2016–17]

7/13/2017 3:36 PM

Western Climate and Energy Options
SAN DIEGO JOURNAL OF CLIMATE & ENERGY LAW

FIGURE 3

Source: https://www.iea.org/media/workshps/2013/ccs/acca21china/JuhoLipponen.
pdf [https://perma.cc/R37C-XHAU].

One can also re-plot the map of GHG emissions in the United States to
take the same data on GHG emissions and display emissions geographically
in relationship to population. This contrasts, given the human users of energy
services, whether a particular area of the country is producing more or less
GHGs than necessary, on average, to serve the population. When adjusted to
per capita GHG emissions, a very different map emerges, in Figure 4.11

11.

Id.
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FIGURE 4
CO2 EMISSIONS PER CAPITA, 2002

Source: https://www.wired.com/2008/04/new-high-res-ma/ [https://perma.cc/W7JP
V63N].

Figure 4 shows a very different data set than Figure 2. The East Coast,
more concentrated in population, is a less intensive emitter of GHGs
adjusted per capita for population. California remains relatively intense.
And certain areas in the West, including Texas and certain of the mountain
states, become much more intensive emitters of GHGs when measured per
capita. GHGs are a national and world problem, not a local problem.12
And if one adjusted the actual source of the emissions, which has some of
the Texas oil and gas producing areas high, although the fossil fuels
are transported elsewhere for actual consumption, certain Western states,
including California would show higher GHG emissions than in Figure 2
above.13
12. See A Student’s Guide to Global Climate Change: Greenhouse Gases, U.S. ENVTL.
PROTECTION AGENCY, https://www3.epa.gov/climatechange/kids/basics/today/greenhouse-gases.
html [https://perma.cc/F4BR-AYZG] (last updated Aug. 30, 2016); Steven Ferrey, Unlocking
The Global Warming Toolbox 6 (2010).
13. McClelland, supra note 10.
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Even more than other sources which produce GHGs in Figures 2 and 4,
electricity moves. It moves at near the speed of light.14 According to
Kirchoff’s Law,15 power moves almost at the speed of light on an energized
grid.16 Figure 5 shows the seven mainland Western states included within
the jurisdiction of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals and how electricity
produced in one state moves to other states. Figure 6 illustrates the flows
of electricity from Western states into California: From Canada, a net 4.8
million Mwh flows into West coast states, from the Pacific Northwest, a
net 22.6 million Mwh flows into California, from the Southwest, a net 44
million Mwh hours flows into California, and from Mexico, a net 0.6
million Mwh flows into California, annually. The Western states generally
net export power to California and to Western Canada.

14. See STEVEN FERREY, Law of Independent Power § 2:1 (40th ed. 2016).
15. This law is also called Kirchhoff’s first law, Kirchhoff’s point rule, Kirchhoff’s
junction rule, and Kirchhoff’s first rule. The principle of conservation of electric charge is
that at any point in an electrical circuit where charge density is not changing in time, the
sum of currents flowing towards that point is equal to the sum of currents flowing away
from that point. See STEVEN FERREY, Law of Independent Power § 10:98 (37th ed. 2015).
16. See Steven Ferrey, Inverting Choice of Law in the Wired Universe: Thermodynamics,
Mass and Energy, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1839, 1911 n.406 (2004).
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FIGURE 5

Source: https://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2015/10/f27/Regional_Climate_
Vulnerabilities_and_Resilience_Solutions_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/T6ST-BMAL].

If one traced the actual flows of electric power, which is alone
responsible for more GHG emissions than any other sector of the U.S.
economy as shown in Figure 6,17 the actual attribution in certain states such
as California increases. Both U.S. policy18 and state policy have targeted the
electric sector to accomplish a disproportionate share of GHG reductions.
The Clean Power Plan19 and the Mercury and Air Toxics Rule,20 key federal
policy to discourage burning of GHG-emitting fossil- fuel-fired power plants,
are federal policy, and both have been temporarily enjoined21 or remanded22

17. Sources of Greenhouse Gas Emissions, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY (Oct. 6, 2016),
https://www3.epa.gov/climatechange/ghgemissions/sources.html [https://perma.cc/Y2PL- L9LR].
18. Standards of Performance for Greenhouse Gas Emissions From New, Modified,
and Reconstructed Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units, 80 Fed. Reg.
64661 (Oct. 23, 2015) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 6-, 70, 71, and 98).
19. Steven Ferrey, Subnational Discretion Mediating New Climate Regulatory
Challenges, 7 SAN DIEGO J. CLIMATE & ENERGY L. 31, 34 (2015–16).
20. National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants Coal- and Oil-Fired
Electric Utility Steam Generating Units and Standards of Performance for Fossil-FuelFired Electric Utility, Industrial Commercial-Institutional, and Small Industrial-CommercialInstitutional Steam Generating Units, 77 Fed. Reg. 9304, 9306 (Feb. 16, 2012) (to be
codified 40 C.F.R. pts. 60 and 63).
21. Order for Stay Granted, 136 S. Ct. 1000, 1000 (2016).
22. Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2704 (2015).
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by the Supreme Court, and the Clean Power Plan has been targeted for
withdrawal by the Trump Administration.
FIGURE 6

Source: U.S. EPA, https://www.epa.gov/ghgemissions/
us-greenhouse-gas-inventory-report-1990-2014 [https://
perma.cc/GD8T-W2VE].

The Obama administration 2015 Clean Power Plan would dramatically limit
CO2 emissions from larger power generation facilities.23 It establishes
dramatically inconsistent and different “best system” CO2 emission
standards for each of the states.24 More than half the states currently are suing
EPA regarding its authority to issue these regulations.25 The Western
states are treated differently. The standards set for the Western states are
as follows: Arizona 1031 lbs. CO2/Mwh, California 828 lbs. CO2/Mwh,
Nevada 855 lbs. CO2/Mwh, Oregon 871 lbs. CO2/Mwh, Washington 983
23. Standards of Performance for Greenhouse Gas Emissions From New, Modified,
and Reconstructed Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units, 80 Fed. Reg.
64661.
24. Ferrey, supra note 19, at 34.
25. Id. at 45.
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lbs. CO2/Mwh.26 A majority of the 50 states have higher emission standard
than any of these Western states.27 This means that the Western states
are already lower than the typical state in terms of higher-carbon use
of oil and coal-fired facilities for the generation of electric power. It does
not necessarily indicate that those states are being required to make more
significant reductions than the other, more Eastern states.
California recently raised its 33 percent renewable electricity standard
for all electric power produced by 2030, to 50 percent of all electric power
must be renewable energy by 2030.28 Applying to all sellers of electricity
and publicly owned utilities, this law raises the standards in three phases
to 40 percent by 2024, 45 percent by 2027 and 50 percent by 2030.29 Along
with Hawaii’s renewable energy standard, these two Western states are the
most ambitious pursuits of renewable energy for power generation among
all states in the nation.
B. Comparative Renewable Energy Potential in Western States
The U.S. has agreed to reduce GHG emissions. 30 This means more
renewable energy used in power production. One needs to distinguish
between intermittent renewable potential and baseload renewable potential.
This is an important distinction, which favors Western states.
There is a problem with how to address excessive GHG emissions—a
technological potential with renewable power and a second conundrum of
how to best deal with the intermittency of the primarily featured resources
of solar and wind renewable power. Here, the Western states have a comparative
advantage in two regards. First, Western states have better access to solar
power. Second, Western states have a disproportionate amount of nonintermittent “baseload” renewable resources.

26. Standards of Performance for Greenhouse Gas Emissions From New, Modified,
and Reconstructed Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units, 80 Fed. Reg. 64661;
Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility
Generating Units, 80 Fed. Reg. 64961–62 (Oct. 23, 2015) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt.
60).
27. Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric
Utility Generating Units, 80 Fed. Reg. 64961–62.
28. S.B. 350, 2015–16 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2015); Carolyn Whetzel, Brown Signs Law
to Put State on Path for Renewables, ENV’T REP., Oct. 7, 2016. (This was the Clean Energy
and Pollution Reduction Act (S.B. 350)).
29. Id.
30. Fact Sheet: US Reports its 2025 Emissions Target to the UNFCC, THE WHITE
HOUSE, https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/03/31/fact-sheet-us-reports-its
2025-emissions-target-unfccc [https://perma.cc/X9U2-DL5H] (last visited, Oct. 2, 2016).
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1. Intermittent Renewable Resources Potential
The intermittency of the 30 days of the month in California for wind
power generation, using CalISO data, is shown on the left side of Figure
7. The amount of wind power available every single day is different across
the 24 hours of the day. The right side of Figure 7 illustrates the profound
intermittency of solar output on a clear day (red parabola) versus a typical
day with passing clouds (the blue radically bouncing line) for a solar
PV panel project.There is significant, uncontrollable variation in intermittent
renewable energy output, which must be carefully managed by policy.
FIGURE 7

Sources: Cal ISO.

Solar power resources are not equally distributed across the U.S., or the
world. Latitude matters. Local climate matters. Logically, the closer one
gets to the equator, the better solar radiation an area would experience.31
There would be more uniform and intense annual insolation, with less variation
in seasonal hours of sunshine. The 90-degree angle of solar insulation to

31. Gerardo R. Ayala Gonzalez, Solar Energy Potential at Different Latitudes,
ALTENERGYMAG. (Aug. 1, 2005, 12:00 AM), http://www.altenergymag.com/article/2005/
08/solar-energy-potential-at-different-latitudes/120/ [https://perma.cc/EFA2-F64D].
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fixed solar photovoltaic (PV) panels produces more electric power than at
the northern latitude of the U.S..32 However, Figure 8, which illustrates
solar resources available, does not show the southern half of the U.S.
enjoying more intense availability of solar power. Rather, it shows a distinct
advantage to the Southwestern U.S. The Southwest has a distinct advantage
to produce and utilize solar power.
FIGURE 8

Source: https://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/images/charts/map_csp_national-large.gif

[https://https://perma.cc/MQ5Y-SY2R].
California, and four other Western states, now allow third-party ownership
of residential PV systems; not all states do this, however.33 This has important
implications for the development of solar power. This third-party ownership
has been a dominant business model,34 with third-party ownership constituting

32.
33.
34.
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greater than 60 percent of residential solar installations in Massachusetts
and greater than 80 percent in Arizona and California.35
FIGURE 9

Source: http://slideplayer.com/slide/4891792/ [https://perma.cc/MEW9-ECUJ].

Solar development has grown exponentially in the U.S., as shown in
Figure 10. Almost two-thirds of the spending on new power plants will
be drawn by renewable energy over the next 25 years, dwarfing spending
on fossil fuels.36 The prices for solar panels are expected to plunge 47
35. U.S. Solar Market Insight Report: Q2 2013, GTM RESEARCH, www.greentechmedia.
com/research/ussmi [https://perma.cc/J6GD-4TUP] (last visited Jan. 30, 2017).
36. Ehren Goossens, Renewables to Beat Fossil Fuels with $3.7 Trillion Solar
Boom, BLOOMBERG TECHNOLOGY (June 23, 2015, 7:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.
com/news/articles/2015-06-23/renewables-to-beat-fossil-fuels-with-3-7-trillion-solar-boom
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percent in coming years under some estimates,37 and solar PV installation
costs are expected to decline 4 percent to 6 percent a year over the next
decade, or a total of 40-60 percent.38
FIGURE 10

U.S. Solar Development

Source: http://breakingenergy.com/2015/02/05/6-new-charts-that-show-us-renewable
energy-progress/ [https://perma.cc/2JZB-AQ8Q].

Regarding the other primary intermittent renewable energy source, wind
power, Figure 11 shows the amount of potential usable wind power
nationwide. Again here, the amount of wind power is more prevalent in
the Western states than in the Eastern states.

[https://perma.cc/55YC-7S3C] (discussing how solar power will draw $3.7 trillion in
investment through 2040. Developing nations will account for 79 percent of 8.9 terawatts
of new power capacity added worldwide.).
37. Id.
38. Alex Morales, Distributed Solar Powers May Triple in Decade, BLOOMBERG
(July 21, 2015, 3:11 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-07-21/distributedsolar-power-revenues-may-triple-in-decade [https://perma.cc/CL7H-R7A3].
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FIGURE 11

Source: http://rredc.nrel.gov/wind/pubs/atlas/maps/chap2/2-01m.html [https://perma.cc/
44FU-GPKA].

2.

Baseload Renewable Resource Potential

The Western states also are better endowed with non-intermittent,
“baseload,” renewable energy resources.
a.

Hydroelectric Baseload Power

After Edison harnessed electricity in the second half of the 1870s, in
1882, the Vulcan Street Plant was the first hydropower plant to operate
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in the U.S.39 By the early 1900s, hydroelectric power accounted for more
than 40 percent of the U.S. supply of electricity.40 Today, more than
2,200 hydropower plants in the U.S. provide the country with 100,000
MW of reliable hydropower capacity.41
Through the Department of Interior Bureau of Reclamation and the
Army Corps of Engineers, the federal government owns 52 percent of
hydropower generation and operates 133 hydroelectric power plants.42
Private utilities, public utilities, and municipalities own the remaining 48
percent of hydropower generation.43 FERC states that “these entities operate
1,623 hydropower facilities in every region in the United States.”44
The Western states have a fair share of this existing hydropower that
supplies state power resources. What is even more important is where the
remaining available hydropower resources are. In 2004, the Department
of Energy analyzed every two-mile stream segment in the U.S. for its
potential for hydropower development.45 This study identified almost
500,000 sites suitable for small-scale hydropower developments, capable
of providing more than 100,000 Mw of power.46 This would represent nearly
10 percent of the nation’s total electric power generation capacity, and
approximately 80 percent of the nation’s supply of renewable energy
generation.47
However, developing future hydropower resources is more than an issue
of water capacity. Our electric power system is a function of incentives and
financial resources. And states play a significant role in these aspects. And
here, not all states are equal.
State Renewable Portfolio Standards (RPS) programs require electric
utilities and other retail electric providers to include in their retail sales a
specified percentage of electricity supply annually from eligible renewable

39. The History of Hydropower Development in the United States, U.S. DEP’T OF
INTERIOR: BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, http://www.usbr.gov/power/edu/history.html [https://
perma.cc/592G-TK6W] (last visited Dec. 20, 2014).
40. See id.
41. See U.S. Hydropower Industry Snapshot, NAT’L HYDROPOWER ASS’N, http://www.
hydro.org/why-hydro/available/industrysnapshot/ [https://perma.cc/KFG2-ZYXJ] (last visited
Dec. 20, 2014).
42. See, Frequently Asked Questions, NAT’L HYDROPOWER ASS’N, http://www.hydro.
org/tech- and- policy/faq/#723 [https://perma.cc/82SP-YJ4F] (last visited Nov. 11, 2016).
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Lea Kosnik, The Potential for Small Scale Hydropower Development in the US,
38 ENERGY POLICY 5512, 5512 (2010).
46. Gina S. Warren, Hydropower: It’s a Small World After All, 91 NEB. L. REV. 925,
957 (2013).
47. Kosnik, supra note 45, at 5512.
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energy sources as dictated by state law.48 These acquisitions are evidenced
by state Renewable Energy Credits (“RECs”) associated with production
of each megawatt-hour of generation from an eligible renewable energy
facility.49 RECs exist as a separate commodity to be traded and transferred,
if allowed by the state.50 The RPS programs in the twenty-nine states
which utilize them are very different in terms of what technologies qualify.
The required state percentage of energy delivered from renewables currently
ranges from 7 to 33 percent of annual retail sales in different state programs.51
Twenty-three of the twenty-nine RPS states allow some form of
hydropower to be eligible in their Renewable Portfolio Standards (RPS)
programs, but almost always with conditions. The top-ten hydropower
generating states allow hydropower facilities to qualify for RPS.52
Two coastal Western states are the leading hydropower states: Washington
and California. Future development of these resources is now a function
of RPS and other state incentives, including the fact that hydropower
resources tend to be inexpensive over their lifetimes, compared to other
sources of power. Washington state’s RPS mandates that utilities generate
15 percent of electricity from renewables by 2020.53 Hydropower projects
are eligible if “incremental electricity produced as a result of efficiency
improvements completed after March 31, 1999, meets certain specifications.”54

48. See Renewable Portfolio Standards, NAT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY LABORATORY,
http://www.nrel.gov/tech_deployment/state_local_governments/basics_portfolio_standards.
html [https://perma.cc/WUD7-PS6Q] (last visited Jan. 30, 2017).
49. Ferrey, supra note 6, at 18.
50. Galen Barbose et al., Tracking the Sun VI: An Historical Summary of the
Installed Photovoltaics in the United States from 1998 to 2012, LAWRENCE WRENCE
BERKELEY NAT’L LABORATORY, 18 (July 2013), https://emp.lbl.gov/sites/all/files/lbnl
6350e_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/D6WN-SWP3].
51. See Steven Ferrey, Threading the Constitutional Needle with Care, 7 TEX. J.
OIL GAS & ENERGY L. 59, 62–63 (2011–2012) (analyzing in detail of all state RPS
programs and their susceptibility to constitutional challenge in particular states).
52. See Hydropower is Available, N AT ’ L H YDROPOWER A SS ’ N , http://www.
hydro.org/why-hydro/available/hydro-in-the-states/ [https://perma.cc/DHZ5-U76N] (last visited
Nov. 11, 2016) (describing the top-ten hydropower generation states include: Alabama,
Arizona, California, Idaho, Montana, New York, South Dakota, Oregon, Tennessee, and
Washington).
53. See State Renewable Portfolio and Standards, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES
(Dec 28, 2016) http://www.ncsl.org/research/energy/renewable-portfolio-standards.aspx
[https://perma.cc/WUD7-PS6Q].
54. See Washington Energy Facts, INST. FOR ENERGY RES., 2, http://institutefor
energyresearch.org/media/state-regs/pdf/Washington.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y68J-NRLZ] (last
visited Dec 21, 2014).

147

FERREY (DO NOT DELETE)

7/13/2017 3:36 PM

Washington routinely contributes more than 25 percent of national
hydroelectric power and leads the nation in electricity generation from
hydroelectric resources, and is among the top ten in electricity generation
from hydroelectric resources, and is among the top ten electricity generation
from renewable resources.55 In 2013, Washington reached a total of 29 percent
of the nation’s net hydroelectricity generation.56 The Grand Coulee Dam
on Washington’s Colombia River has a total generating capacity of 6,809
Mw and is the largest hydroelectric power producer in the United States.57
California is the second-largest producer of electricity from hydropower in
the U.S..58 California is also a leader in net electricity generation because
of several renewable energy sources, including geothermal, solar, wind,
and biomass.59 California’s RPS was originally established by legislation
in 2002.60 The program requires California’s electric utilities to increase
procurement from eligible renewable resources to 33% by year 2020 and to
50 percent by year 2030.61 California has nearly 287 hydro-power plants, located
mostly in its eastern mountain ranges, which “have a total dependable capacity
of about 21,000 MW of capacity.”62
However, California’s RPS limits eligible hydropower facilities to only
small and medium-scale facilities of under 30 MW size each to qualify
as renewable energy.63 In addition to size limitation, if a small hydropower
facility causes adverse impact on in-stream beneficial uses or causes change
in stream flow, it will not qualify as an eligible RPS renewable facility.64
Besides California, 25 of the 29 states that have RPS incentive systems, allow

55. See Washington Energy Facts, INST. FOR ENERGY RES. 2, http://institutefor
energyresearch.org/media/state-regs/pdf/Washington.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y68J-NRLZ] (last
visited Dec. 21, 2014).
56. See id.
57. See id. (the Grand Coulee Dam is the largest generating facility of any kind
when measured by capacity in the U.S.).
58. See California State Profile and Energy Estimates: Profile Overview, U.S.
ENERGY INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION, http://www.eia.gov/state/?sid=CA [https://perma.
cc/V83T-6P8E] (last visited Jan. 30, 2017).
59. See id. (pointing out that the “Geysers facility,” located in the Mayacamas
Mountains, is the largest complex of geothermal power plants in the world, with more than
700 megawatts of installed capacity).
60. See California Renewable Portfolio Standard, DSIRE (Oct. 7, 2015), http://
programs.dsireusa.org/system/program/detail/840 [https://perma.cc/86R7-BGPS] (describing
California’s RPS program and eligible requirements).
61. See id.
62. See Hydroelectric Power in California, CAL. ENERGY COMM’N, http://www.
energy.ca.gov/hydroelectric/ [https://perma.cc/LTM2-A8X7] (last visited Jan. 30, 2017).
63. See id.
64. See State Renewable Portfolio Standard (RPS) And Hydropower Provisions,
HYDROPOWER REFORM COALITION (July 2014), http://www.hydroreform.org/sites/default/files/
2014-07%20hrc_state_rps_3.pdf [https://perma.cc/HU9L-BERK].
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only small hydroelectric power facilities of between 5-30 MW maximum size
per facility to qualify for their state RPS program.65
It is useful to evaluate how use of nonrenewable resources is changing
over time, even in as little time as a decade. Figure 13 shows changes over a
recent decade of renewable power in each state between hydro and nonhydro renewable resource use. The white-shaded states do not use much
renewable energy. In 2003, the Western states that used renewable resources
used more hydroelectric resources than other renewable resources.
A decade later, as reflected in the 2013 data in Figure 12, while most of
the states, including the Western states, remained similarly positioned,
California shifted to a more abundant use of non-hydro renewable resources,
particularly solar power. This is a function, in part, of state renewable energy
goals and RPS programs in a particular state.66 Several mid-continent
states were in a similar position in 2013, where greater use of wind power
had shifted their use of renewable resources. The point to note is that
California and other mid-continental states are shifting towards more use
of intermittent, rather than “baseload” hydro, renewable resources. This
has implications for grid reliability.

65. See Patrick Donnelly-Shores, Will RPS Statutes Be Watered Down by Hydro?,
BERKELEY ENERGY & RESOURCE COLLABORATIVE (Apr. 3, 2013), http://berc.berkeley.edu/
will-rps-statutes-be-watered-down-by-hydro/ [https://perma.cc/R84K-JU4R] (indicating
that almost all RPS states have a limit on size, and most allow only small-scale hydro).
66. See SB 350, supra note 28.
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FIGURE 12

Source: https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=17351 [https://perma.cc/
HDS5-TJNQ].

b.

Geothermal “Baseload” Renewable Resources

Geothermal is a “baseload” power generation resource in the sense that
it can be managed to produce around the clock, or at specific designated
times, rather than in an uncontrolled, sporadic pattern like wind and solar
power. This makes geothermal resources a tremendous asset. Figure 13
illustrates where geothermal power resources are located in the U.S.. They
are located in a handful of the Western states and not in any of the Eastern
states.
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FIGURE 13

Source: http://www.nrel.gov/gis/images/geothermal_resource2009-final.jpg
[https://perma.cc/X2F2-5HV2].

Figure 14 illustrates that the Western states of California and Nevada are
unique in that their major non-hydro renewable energy source is geothermal
energy; unlike the majority of states where the primary non-hydro
renewable energy source is intermittent wind or solar power. Geothermal is a
“baseload” manageable resource. This does not mean that California and
Nevada do not have abundant solar resources to develop. As shown in Figure
8 above, California and Nevada have abundant non-GHG-emitting solar
resources to develop. What this indicates is that California and Nevada have
already balanced their renewable energy development with “baseload”
geothermal and hydroelectric power resources. Of note, Figure 15 illustrates
that solar and geothermal resources, combined at approximately 0.5% of
all electric power resources, were less than 20% the contribution of wind
resources, and less than 10% the contribution of hydroelectric resources.

151

FERREY (DO NOT DELETE)

7/13/2017 3:36 PM

FIGURE 14

Source: https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=6110#tabs_Renewables
Maps-2 [https://perma.cc/9XA2-C5XG].

The challenge of climate change is a forward-looking challenge.
Business-as-usual does not work to halt climate warming. So a key challenge
is which GHG emissions can be mitigated in the near-term future? Going
forward, Figure 15 shows that the Western states are the only states with
both great and efficient solar (shown in red) and hydro power (shown in
dots) capabilities still to exploit. Having both resources combines intermittent
and “baseload” renewable power potential development. The Western states
have a significant potential to move power between them, as shown in
Figure 15.
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FIGURE 15: FUTURE SOLAR AND HYDROELECTRIC CAPACITY

Source: https://www1.eere.energy.gov/water/pdfs/npd_report.pdf [https://
perma.cc/C98J-U46C].

The various figures above show that the Western states, particularly
California, have the best solar power potential in the U.S. and a significant
potential for additional hydropower and geothermal development. California
also has agricultural biomass resources to develop for power production.
This is more than simple abundance of resources. It is the key integration
of both plentiful renewable resources and solar, which have the limiting
factor as they are intermittent and not reliable at a specific location, with
“baseload” renewable resources of hydro and geothermal that can be managed
in terms of its power output to compensate for the intermittency of solar
and wind. Together, both are the “nut” and “bolt” to transition to a much
larger percentage of renewable power in the generation mix. This is
a complementary balance of renewable power within a single region of
the country or state(s).
The importance of this, as we transition into Section III and examine
legal issues, is that the states, not the federal government, are the lead players
and stakeholders in the transaction to a more carbon-friendly, renewable
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energy-based, energy structure in the U.S.67 What matters is state policy.
We have 55 separate renewable energy policies in the U.S., each for a
different state, the District of Columbia, and various U.S. territories. The
interesting tension is that in 2016 the Supreme Court, several federal circuit
courts of appeals, and FERC decisions have stricken certain uses of state
power over the power sector and strengthened federal power.
III. SUPREME COURT AND KEY FEDERAL PRECEDENT
The Western states are different in terms of energy law. This is more
than just a coincidence. It is a function of regulatory and court distinctions.
This is for three reasons:
1. Their total lack of participation in any multi-state ISO wholesale
power markets;
2. The out-of-the norm decisions of the Ninth Circuit (covering 9
Western states) on constitutional limitation on state energy authority
compared to every other circuit court in the country and the
Supreme Court;
3. Recent 2016 legal decisions restricting state power when the
state participates in a multi-state ISO.
This Section examines each of these legal factors.
A. Ninth Circuit Constitutional Energy Law Distinctions
Compared to Other Circuit Courts
1. The Ninth Circuit Decision Regarding California
Energy Regulation
In California, regulations regarding greenhouse gas reduction include
an element called the low carbon fuel standard (LCFS), the purpose of
which is to “reduce greenhouse gas emissions by reducing the full fuel-cycle,
carbon intensity of the transportation fuel pool used in California . . . .”68
By the year 2020, the LCFS rule is to reduce the carbon content of
transportation fuels sold in California by 10% from the year 2010 baseline.69
The LCFS regulates transportation fuels that are “sold, supplied, or offered
for sale in California” and focuses on the “carbon intensity” of fuels . . . .”70

67.
68.
69.
70.
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Carbon intensity is not only limited to how much carbon the fuel contains,
but also includes the amount of carbon released in the full fuel cycle.71
Under the California regulations, each pathway for producing ethanol and
other low-carbon liquid fuels is given three carbon intensity scores: direct
emissions, land use or other indirect effects, and a total score.72 Parties
calculate their Carbon Intensity Rating and then receive a credit or deficit
depending on that score.73 Thus, the provider’s carbon intensity score is
affected by the location and origination of its commerce.
In a case in the Eastern District of California, Rocky Mountain Farmers
Union v. Goldstene,74 which is distinct from a somewhat similar suit brought
in California state court involving the LCFS rule,75 plaintiffs challenged

71. See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, § 95481 (a)(20) (WestlawNext through 1/20/17
Register 2017, No. 3); see also id. (a)(49) (“Life cycle greenhouse gas emissions’ means
the aggregate quantity of greenhouse gas emissions (including direct emissions and significant
indirect emissions such as significant emissions from land use changes), as determined by
the Executive Officer, related to the full fuel lifecycle, including all stages of fuel and
feedstock production and distribution, from feedstock generation or extraction through the
distribution and delivery and use of the finished fuel to the ultimate consumer, where the
mass values for all greenhouse gases are adjusted to account for their relative global
warming potential.”).
72. See Low Carbon Fuel Standard Guidance Document, AIR RESOURCES BOARD
http://www.arb.ca.gov/fuels/lcfs/LCFS_Guidance_(Final_v.1.0).pdf [https://perma.cc/2VSQC3UA] (last visited Nov. 12, 2016) (“Before a regulated party can generate credits for its
fuel or blendstock, the regulated party must get approval from the Executive Officer of its
physical pathway demonstration. A ‘physical pathway’ is a combination of actual fuel
delivery methods (e.g. trucking routes, rail lines, pipelines, etc.) through which the regulated
party reasonably expects the fuel to be transported to California. Therefore, the requirement for
a regulated party to demonstrate its physical pathway serves to document the physical
route by which the product is expected to get to California, therefore providing an enforceable
linkage from an out-of-state producer to the regulated party in California (e.g. fuel blender,
producer, importer or provider in California.”).
73. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, § 95486 (1) (WestlawNext through 1/20/17 Register
2017, No. 3) (“The total number of credits generated through the supply of fuels or blendstocks
with carbon intensity values below that of the applicable standard will be deposited in a
credit account of the applicable regulated party or credit generator. Once banked, credits
may be retained indefinitely, retired to meet a compliance obligation, or transferred to
other regulated parties or credit generators.”).
74. Rocky Mountain Farmer’s Union v. Corey, 730 F.3d 1070, 1081 (9th Cir. 2013).
75. Poet, LLC. v. State Air Res. Bd., 160 Cal Rptr. 3d 69. (Ct. App. 2013) (arguing
that CARB failed to respond to numerous public comments, that it omitted documents from the
rulemaking file, and that the LCFS will lead to increased GHG emissions, not the reductions it
promises; Poet alleged that CARB’s LCFS rule exceeds the scope of authority delegated
to it by the legislature).
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the LCFS rule as being anti-competitive and violating the Dormant Commerce
Clause of the Constitution.76
Specifically, the plaintiffs focused on LCFS’ extraterritorial regulations.
They stated “for ethanol produced outside California, only two parts of
the overall lifecycle of the ethanol transportation of the ethanol within
California and the combustion of ethanol in a motor vehicle in operation
occur inside California.”77 Additionally, the complaint challenged the carbon
intensity calculations that took into account the “so-called indirect ‘land
use or other indirect effect’ from the production of corn itself, predominantly
in the Midwest, ascribing a penalty to all corn ethanol based on its assumed
indirect contribution to worldwide GHG emissions.”78 Because of this
calculation, Plaintiffs contended that the LCFS “penalizes all corn ethanol
based on the purported indirect effects of assumed farming practices that
occur predominantly outside California, and through the regulation California
seeks to curb or eliminate these farming practices throughout the United
States and beyond by making the entire corn ethanol market responsible
for them.”79
The state defended by arguing that the LCFS used scientific principles
to reduce emissions, therefore not intentionally discriminating.80 California
also argued that even if strict scrutiny applied, there were no alternative
viable means to achieve their goal of reducing emissions in the State.81 The
state argued that the LCFS “reduces the carbon intensity of transportation
fuels,” and it “captures emission reductions that cannot be captured by
measures requiring GHG reductions from vehicles or fewer vehicle miles
traveled.”82 Moreover, measuring fuel’s carbon intensity was “the only
scientifically accepted and effective approach to accurately quantify emissions
fuels and increase the use of lower carbon fuels.”83 Finally, the “LCFS also
spurs the innovation of next-generation fuels that are necessary to achieve
the emissions reductions.”84
In 2011, the federal district court invalidated certain parts of the LCFS
rule and enjoined the rule’s enforcement, since it “discriminate[d] against

76. Rocky Mountain Farmer’s Union v. Goldstene, 843 F. Supp. 2d 1071, 1081
(E.D. Cal. 2011), rev’d sub nom. Rocky Mountain Farmer’s Union v. Corey, 730 F.3d
1070 (9th Cir. 2013).
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Appellants’ Opening Brief at 94, Rocky Mountain Farmer’s Union v. Goldstene,
730 F.3d 1070 (No. 12-15131, 12-15135), 2012 WL 2338857.
81. Id. at 98.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
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out-of-state corn-derived ethanol while favoring in-state corn ethanol and
impermissibly regulate[d] extraterritorial conduct.”85 The court held that
the LCFS differentiated based on place of origin of the commerce and
concluded that it facially discriminated against out-of-state corn-derived
ethanol.86 The court held that the LCFS “may not impose a barrier to
interstate commerce based on the distance that the product must travel in
interstate commerce.”87
On appeal, in a split decision, with a vigorous dissent, the Ninth Circuit
reversed the trial court finding of unconstitutionality.88 The majority
determined that it was acceptable for a state to calculate transportation
CO2 in the carbon emissions index or rating of delivered fuel.89 The court
noted that the district court erred by “ignoring GHG emissions related to:
(1) the electricity used to power the conversion process, (2) the efficiency
of the ethanol plant, and (3) the transportation of the feedstock, ethanol,
and co-products,” factors that are indeed connected to location, but alone
were all just ways to calculate CI.90 The Ninth Circuit concluded that
without careful considerations of pathways “we cannot understand whether
the challenged regulation responds to genuine threats of harm or to the
mere out-of-state status of an ethanol pathway.”91
The Ninth Circuit also concluded that factoring location was not facially
discriminatory; besides discrimination, there are many other reasons why
location is factored in.92 California had “valid scientific” reasons for
considering the origin of the fuels and the pathways it traveled, the reasons
were not facially discriminating.93 Finally, regarding the extraterritorial
regulating, the circuit court concluded that the LCFS only regulated
California’s market, and while it may incentivize the behavior of others,
LCFS is only required if they wanted to sell in the state of California.94

85. Rocky Mountain Farmer’s Union v. Goldstene, No. CV-F-09-2234 LJO DLB,
CV-F-10-163 LJO DLB, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 149592, (E.D. Cal. Dec. 29, 2011).
86. Rocky Mountain Farmer’s Union v. Goldstene, 843 F. Supp. 2d 1071, 1087
(E.D. Cal. 2011).
87. Id. at 1086.
88. Rocky Mountain Farmer’s Union v. Corey, 730 F.3d 1070, 1107 (9th Cir. 2013).
89. Id. at 1088.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 1089.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 1105.
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The producers were free to not comply with California regulations and to
sell in any other part of the country if they wished.95
A petition for an en banc rehearing was denied, with the dissent noting
that, “California could—under the majority’s reasoning—penalize out-of
state wineries to account for the environmental effects of transporting their
wines to California.”96 This decision was unlike any other circuit court and
Supreme Court decisions, which determined that even if environmental
preservation were the central purpose of the pricing order, that would not
be sufficient to uphold a discriminatory regulation.”97 The Ninth Circuit
majority sidesteps the West Lynn Supreme Court precedent.98
2. The Ninth Circuit Decision Regarding Oregon Energy Regulation
The Western states expanded the scope and impact of the Ninth Circuit’s
Rocky Mountain decision. As a point of comparison, no other circuit court
in the country, nor the Supreme Court, has held the same. Oregon has no
oil refineries and imports its fuel from California, Utah and Washington.
In January of 2015, Oregon’s Environmental Quality Commission (EQC)
enacted a LCFS with close similarity to California’s LCFS regulation.99
Like California, Oregon’s CI scores are also calculated based on the type
of fuel, its means of production and distribution, and other factors.100
Subsequently in 2015, plaintiffs filed a complaint alleging that the Oregon
Program: “(1) discriminates against out-of-state commerce in violation of
95. Id. at 1104.
96. Rocky Mountain Farmer’s Union v. Corey, 740 F.3d 507, 518 (9th Cir. 2014).
97. West Lynn Creamery v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186 (1994).
98. Id.
99. Am. Fuel & Petrochemical Mfrs. v. O’Keeffe, 134 F. Supp. 3d 1270, 1275 (D.
Or. Sept. 23, 2015), appeal docketed, No. 15-35834 (9th Cir. Oct. 27 2015) (explaining
that the program began in 2009 when the Oregon EQC was directed by the State to adopt
rules aimed at decreasing greenhouse gases produced by transportation fuels. Phase 1
began on January 1, 2013, when the state began requiring regulated parties—i.e. “[a]ll
persons that produce in Oregon or import into Oregon any regulated fuel”—to register for
the Oregon Program and record/report the volumes and carbon intensities of their
transportation fuels. Then in January of 2015 phase 2 began, which, required regulated
parties to meet annual clean fuel standards. Starting in 2016, the regulated parties participate in
a trading system similar to California’s; they use credits and deficits. The credits and
deficits will be “generated when clean fuel is produced, imported, dispensed or used in
Oregon.” Producers can then buy or sell their credits, choosing to save them or to offset
any deficits they may have based on their CI scores.).
100. Id. at 1275–76 (explaining that each entity that produces fuel in Oregon or
imports fuel into the state must meet average carbon intensity limits across all of its
products. Id. It can demonstrate compliance by producing or importing only fuels that meet
the standard, by producing or importing fuels that meet the standard in aggregate, or by
purchasing credits generated by fuels below the standard to reduce the average intensity
of its products.).
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the Commerce Clause; (2) regulates extraterritorial activity in violation of
the Commerce Clause and principles of interstate federalism; (3) is expressly
preempted by section 211(c) of the Clean Air Act (“CAA”) and the
Environmental Protection Agency’s (“EPA”) Reformulated Gasoline Rule
(“RFGR”); and (4) is conflict preempted by section 211(o) of the CAA,
which contains the Renewable Fuel Standard (“RFS”) as amended by the
Energy Independence and Security Act (“EISA”).”101 Specifically the
plaintiffs alleged:
The only fuels produced in Oregon are biofuels that meet the carbon intensity
standard. Biofuel producers could sell into the Oregon market at will, or generate
credits and sell those credits to importers of other types of fuel. Plaintiffs argue
that the LCFS is designed as an incentive to these producers and therefore discriminates
in favor of Oregon industry at the expense of out-of-state industry.102

They also argued that by considering out-of-state production processes in
setting carbon intensity limits and measuring the carbon intensity of a
product, Oregon is impermissibly regulating out-of-state conduct.103
A federal judge dismissed the suit based on a failure of proof to show
that the program discriminates against out-of-state commerce in violation
of the Commerce Clause.104 The court also ruled the program is not expressly
preempted by section 211(c) of the Clean Air Act and the Environmental
Protection Agency’s Reformulated Gasoline Rule (RFGR).105 In the decision,
the judge relied on the prior Ninth Circuit decision in Rocky Mountain
Farmers Union v. Corey, 730 F.3d 1070 (2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 2875,
134 S. Ct. 2884 (2014).106 “Whatever effects the Oregon Program may
101. Id. at 1276.
102. Commerce Clause and Supremacy Clause Challenge to Low-Carbon Fuel Standard,
STATE POWER PROJECT, http://statepowerproject.org/oregon/ [https://perma.cc/CD77-PD77]
(last visited Jan. 30, 2017).
103. Id.
104. Am. Fuel & Petrochemical Mfrs., 134 F. Supp. 3d at 1284.
105. Id. at 1284–86 (plaintiffs argued that the standards are preempted by the Clean
Air Act, citing Section 211(c)(4) of the statute, which provides that “no State (or political
subdivision thereof) may prescribe or attempt to enforce, for purpose of motor vehicle
emission control, any control or prohibition respecting any characteristic or component of
a fuel” if the Environmental Protection Agency has found that no controls are necessary.).
106. Id. at 1279 (relying on the Ninth Circuit decision in Rocky Mountain, and rejecting
this attempt at “selective comparison, which excludes relevant [competing] fuel pathways”
and holding that discrimination claims, whether premised on ethanol or petroleum, must
be viewed “in context of the full market.”); id. at 1280 (citing Rocky Mountain for the
proposition that the CI scores were legitimate for scientific reasons and not solely for
discriminatory purposes).
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ultimately have on Oregon’s biofuels market, there are no plausible allegations
demonstrating that out-of-state producers will be commercially disadvantaged
or considerably burdened.”107
The Ninth Circuit has twice found that the similar LCFS of two coastal
Western states do not violate the Constitution. Although these cases involved
liquid fuels rather than electricity—an important difference legally because
this does not implicate the Federal Power Act—no other federal circuits
nor the Supreme Court have held similarly. This places the Ninth Circuit,
and the nine states within its jurisdiction, in a unique position in Constitutional
jurisprudence.
B. The 2016 Supreme Court Decision
An energy regulation in Maryland motivated a challenge under the
Supremacy Clause and the Commerce Clause of the Constitution.108 Maryland
adopted competitive state retail markets, along with a dozen other states,
at the end of the 20th century and had its retail utilities participate in the
PJM Independent Service Organization (PJM ISO).109 The PJM interstate
wholesale “capacity auction” is designed to ensure that winning electricity
generation will be constructed to meet future demand, taking bids approximately
three years before need and selecting future generator bids from proposals
which agree to install the selected power generating capacity within that
three year “window.”110 PJM provides capacity payments to winning generation
facilities in the capacity auction for siting new power generation selected
as the most competitive capacity auction bids throughout this thirteen state
area.111
Within this PJM market rubric, Maryland required its utilities to enter
long-term “contracts for differences” (“CfD,” a form of power purchase
agreement (PPA)) only with certain designated independent power producers
107. Id. at 1283.
108. PPL Energyplus, LLC v. Nazarian, 974 F. Supp. 2d 790 (D. Md. 2013), aff’d,
PPL EnergyPlus, LLC v. Nazarian, 753 F.3d 467 (4th Cir. 2014).
109. Cf. PJM, http://www.pjm.com/about-pjm/who-we-are.aspx [https://perma.cc/
R3PQ-5P8X] (last visited Jan. 30, 2017).
110. Hughes v. Talen Energy Mktg., LLC, 136 S. Ct. 1288, 1293–94 (2016); id. at
93 (noting that if a capacity owner’s bid is accepted, it is said to have “cleared” the auction.
Capacity owners that have cleared the market by remaining in as the bid price bar is
lowered, are all paid the clearing price for capacity, which is the price of the highest
accepted bid.); id. at 1294 (noting that FERC’s Minimum Offer Price Rule requires new
generators to submit their initial bids at a price set by the grid operator unless they can
demonstrate that this price exceeds their actual costs.); id. (noting that Once a capacity
owner has submitted a clearing bid, in subsequent rounds of the auction, it can submit a
lower bid of its own choosing, and may be able to take advantage of the New Entry Price
Adjustment (“NEPA”) rule, which guarantees stable prices for three years.).
111. Id. at 1295.
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willing to locate their new electricity generation capacity in Maryland or
in the District of Columbia.112 Maryland law required its regulated retail
utilities to enter into a 20-year CfD with the winning in-state project bidder;
Commercial Power Ventures, Maryland (“CPV”) won this entitlement.113
The Maryland CfD provided that regardless of the price set for all wholesale
capacity in the PJM FERC-approval114 capacity auction,115 the Maryland
utilities, and ultimately Maryland retail electric customers, would “top-off”
that price to the Maryland guaranteed price,116 up to a Maryland CfD ceiling
amount.117
Constitutional challenges were raised by unselected wholesale power
generators who alleged that they were disadvantaged.118 The Supreme Court
in 2016 unanimously upheld the Fourth Circuit opinion and held that the

112. Id. at 1295–96, n.9.
113. Id. at 1290.
114. See STEVEN FERREY, LAW OF INDEPENDENT POWER, supra note 14, at §§ 8:10,
10:87, 10:91; STEVEN FERREY, THE NEW RULES: A GUIDE TO ELECTRIC MARKET REGULATION
49–50 ( 2000) (Regional Transmission Organizations (RTOs) or Independent System
Operators (ISOs) are FERC-approved and regulated entities which facilitate commercial
electricity transfers, through a private corporation that functions as a tariff administrator.
RTOs are responsible for managing both electrical and financial transactions, including
scheduling transmission transactions, dispatching generation, and managing the entire
accounting for the grid capacity and energy charges and transmission fees.).
115. PJM, an ISO, is a FERC-created and authorized entity. PJM History, PJM,
http://www.pjm.com/about-pjm/who-we-are/pjm-history.aspx [https://perma.cc/6AC7-M7ZX]
(last visited Jan 30, 2017). In the PJM ISO, which serves multiple Eastern states, there are
two retail energy markets, a real-time (spot) and a day-ahead (forward) market. See PJM Manual
11: Energy & Ancillary Services Market Operations, PJM, http://www.pjm.com/~/media/
documents/manuals/m11.ashx [https://perma.cc/Z85X-BU9Z] (last visited Feb. 3, 2017);
see also http://www.ferc.gov/market-oversight/mkt-electric/pjm.asp [https://perma.cc/GB7NCQRU] (last visited Jan. 30, 2017). The basis of calculating the electricity price in either
market is Locational Marginal Pricing. Amended and Restated Operating Agreement of
PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., PJM, Schedule 1, ch. 2 (July 14, 2011), http://www.pjm.com/
media/documents/merged-tariffs/oa.pdf [https://perma.cc/G99B-8PVD]. PJM’s capacitymarket model, the Reliability Pricing Model, was implemented in 2007 as the successor to its
Capacity Credit Market design, as a series of auctions for a delivery year approximately
three years in the future. See Joseph Bowring, Capacity Markets in PJM, 2 ECON. OF
ENERGY & ENVTL. POL’Y No. 2, 50 (2013), https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/1159/9bf6bf2979d
827a9924c9443d73357f1ab1c.pdf [https://perma.cc/L65D-6NQE]. PJM’s demand curve,
the Variable Resources Requirement, defines the price for a given capacity commitment
relative to the applicable reliability requirement, defined for each constrained Locational
Delivery Area. Id.
116. PPL Energyplus, LLC v. Nazarian, 974 F. Supp. 2d 790, 831 (D. Md. 2013).
117. See Hughes, 136 S. Ct. 1288.
118. Id. at 1292.
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Maryland statute intrudes on exclusive FERC wholesale market authority.119
In Hughes, the Supreme Court articulates that, “We agree with the Fourth
Circuit’s judgment that Maryland’s program sets an interstate wholesale rate,
contravening the FPA’s division of authority between state and federal
regulators.”120
C. ISO Distinctions in the Western States
The legal interpretations of the different Federal Circuits, with the Western
states’ Ninth Circuit being currently distinct from others on energy, are
not the only legal distinctions affecting the Western states. There also is
the electric power jurisdiction of the independent system operators (ISOs).
If a particular state and its utilities elect to participate in an ISO subject to
federal jurisdiction, FERC, a federal authority, and not state regulators,
approves all regional transmission organization (RTO) and ISO terms of
service and the financial tariffs.121 All national ISOs and regional transmission
organizations are shown in Figure 17.
With approximately 60% of U.S. consumers served by a utility whose
wholesale and transmission electric power transactions are governed by a
single ISO, the Western states alone are not in this category. As shown in
Figure 17, the Western half of the U.S. is not served by an ISO, apart from
California, which is one of only two single-state ISOs in the U.S. (the other
is New York). Thus, the Western states, excluding California, constitute
the largest block of states in the entire U.S. not served by an ISO. FERC
controls the ISOs, where states not in an ISO are not subject to similar mandates.
While this somewhat defeats the multi-state larger territory purpose of
ISOs as designed by FERC, it leaves these states with more legal freedom
in its state energy regulation.

119. Id.
120. Id. at 1297.
121. See FERREY, THE NEW RULES: A GUIDE TO ELECTRIC MARKET REGULATION, supra
note 114, at 49–50.
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FIGURE 16

Source: https://www.ferc.gov/industries/electric/indus-act/rto/elec-ovr-rto-map.pdf
[https://perma.cc/LSB2-HMVY].

None of the nine states in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals jurisdiction
(See Figure 1) is within a multi-state ISO (See Figure 17). Given recent
2016 federal court decisions,122 this makes the Western states different in
terms of federal ISO legal authority and less federally constricted without
an ISO needing to balance multi-state interests.123 Moreover, from a technical
perspective, the Western states are not interconnected electrically to either
122. See infra Section IV.
123. FERC Order 1000 requires ISO to consider and balance state policies, which
can become convoluted with contrary state policies. Transmission Planning and Cost
Allocation by Transmission Owning and Operating Public Utilities, 76 Fed. Reg. 49842
(Aug. 11, 2011) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35); see also Transmission Planning and
Cost Allocation by Transmission Owning and Operating Public Utilities, 139 FERC 61132
(2012) ,2012 WL 1758693; Transmission Planning and Cost Allocation by Transmission
Owning and Operating Public Utilities, 77 Fed. Reg. 32184 (May 31, 2012) (to be codified
at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35); Transmission Planning and Cost Allocation by Transmission Owning
and Operating Public Utilities, 141 FERC 61044 (2012), 2012 WL 5063059; Transmission
Planning and Cost Allocation by Transmission Owning and Operating Public Utilities, 77
Fed. Reg. 64 890 (Oct. 24, 2012) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35).
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the Eastern two-thirds of the U.S. or to Texas, Hawaii, or Alaska in the West.
Texas is segregated electrically from the rest of the Western states, as
shown in Figure 18’s transmission map.
FIGURE 17
U.S. TRANSMISSION GRID

Source: http://pubs.naruc.org/pub/5388F5DB-2354-D714-51E2-2D3D289
71516 [https://perma.cc/TD5W-WDFX].

The Western Interconnection is an entire electric transmission system
not operating through an ISO (with the exception of California, which is
not a multi-state ISO). This makes the Western states distinct and different
in their ability to regulate aspects of some electric power transactions.
IV. DISTINCTIONS CONTRARY TO THE WESTERN STATE
PRECEDENT IN OTHER CIRCUITS
The Ninth Circuit’s two decisions on the Dormant Commerce Clause
are distinct from that of the other circuits. In this section, briefly because
of space limitations, are highlights of recent relevant holdings of other
federal circuit courts.
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A. Eighth Circuit
The state of North Dakota challenged the constitutionality of a Minnesota
statute restricting the import of coal-fired power into Minnesota124 and
regulating emissions, which impacted climate from power plants that import
electricity into the regional mid-American grid.125 North Dakota alleged
that Minnesota’s statute interferes with the interstate transmission and
wholesale marketing of electric power in the integrated interstate region.126
The Commerce Clause of the Constitution is the basis of the Federal Power
Act, 127 which establishes exclusive FERC regulation of interstate and
wholesale power transactions.128 Both the opinions of the Eighth Circuit
and the trial court distinguish the flow of electricity as unique and apart
from other energy sources and distinguishes this holding from that of the
Ninth Circuit in Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, involving liquid
ethanol fuel.129
Each of the three appellate judges highlighted different constitutional
violations of this statute. The opinion of one judge on the Eighth Circuit
panel affirmed the district court opinion130 which held that the challenged
prohibitions have the practical effect of controlling conduct beyond the
boundaries of Minnesota.131 That trial court decision also held that the
statute has extraterritorial reach which will impose Minnesota’s policy,
increasing the cost of electricity by restricting out-of-state coal sources of
power supply and interfering with the federally-approved MISO transmission

124. North Dakota v. Heydinger, 15 F. Supp. 3d 891 (D. Minn. 2014), aff’d, 825 F.3d
912 (8th Cir. 2016).
125. Id. at 897–98 (noting that if the state fails to adopt a plan, the Act prohibits any
“person” from: (1) constructing a “new large energy facility” in Minnesota that would contribute
to statewide power sector carbon dioxide emissions, (2) “import[ing] or commit[ting] to
import” power from a new large energy facility that would contribute to statewide power
sector carbon dioxide emissions, or (3) entering into a new long-term power purchase
agreement that would increase statewide power sector carbon dioxide emissions, unless the
project developer offset its emissions to the satisfaction of the state public utility commission.).
126. Id. at 910.
127. Id.
128. 16 U.S.C.A. 824a (WestlawNext through P.L. 114-254).
129. North Dakota v. Heydinger, 825 F.3d 912, 929 n.6 (8th Cir. 2016).
130. Id. at 923.
131. Id. at 913–14 (noting that the Minnesota statute violates the dormant Commerce
Clause by regulating purely “extraterritorial” economic activity—consistent with the
finding of the trial court, including the award of attorneys’ fees for plaintiffs to be paid by
the state.).
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system.132 Two of the judges found that the Minnesota statute violated
the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution and was preempted, rather than
needing to reach the Commerce Clause issue.133 All three court of appeals
judges agreed that the Minnesota statute was unconstitutional and concurred
with the trial court opinion striking the statute on constitutional grounds
and upheld the trial court’s award of attorney fees to plaintiffs, to be paid
by the taxpayers of Minnesota which enacted the unconstitutional statute.134
B. Second Circuit
An opinion specific to electric power, not liquid fuels as in the Western
states, by the Second Circuit assumes a contrary interpretation of the
Constitution from that of the Ninth Circuit.135 Vermont was challenged
in its attempt to regulate the power sales of an already-licensed independent
power producer located in the state, and selling its power wholesale in
interstate commerce. The federal trial court held that this Vermont regulation
of energy violated the Supremacy Clause in two different regards and was
preempted, although in a third regard one of the preemption claims was
not yet ripe.136 The Vermont federal trial court decision held:
Under the Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. § 791a et seq.:
Congress has drawn a bright line between state and federal authority in the
setting of wholesale rates and in the regulation of agreements that affect
wholesale rates. States may not regulate in areas where FERC has properly
exercised its jurisdiction to determine just and reasonable wholesale rates or
to insure that agreements affecting wholesale rates are reasonable. Miss.
Power & Light Co. v. Miss. ex rel. Moore, 487 U.S. 354, 374 (1988). . . .[A]
state “must . . . give effect to Congress’ desire to give FERC plenary authority
over interstate wholesale rates, and to ensure that the States do not interfere
with this authority.” Nantahala Power & Light Co. v. Thornburg, 476 U.S.
953, 966 (1986)…. Under the “filed-rate doctrine,” state courts and regulatory
agencies are preempted by federal law from requiring the payment of rates
other than the federal filed rate. See Entergy La., Inc. v. La. Pub. Serv.
Comm’n, 539 U.S. 39, 47 (2003) (“The filed rate doctrine requires ‘that interstate

132. Id.
133. Id. at 923–28 (Murphy, J., concurring, and Colloton, J., concurring) (one
concurring opinion held that the statute is preempted by the Federal Power Act, which
grants the federal government exclusive authority over all terms for all wholesale sales of
power; the other concurring opinion held that the Minnesota “statute bans wholesale sales
of electric energy in interstate commerce,” and therefore is preempted by the Federal
Power Act, and to the extent that the statute is not totally preempted by the Federal Power
Act, it is wholly preempted by the federal Clean Air Act.).
134. Id.
135. Entergy Nuclear Vt. Yankee, LLC v. Shumlin, 838 F. Supp. 2d 183, 224 (D. Vt.
2012), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 733 F.3d 393 (2d Cir. 2013).
136. Id. at 242.
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power rates filed with FERC or fixed by FERC must be given binding effect
by state utility commissions determining intrastate rates.’”).137

This decision relies on the Supreme Court decisions Mississippi Power
and Nantahala, which are the key preemption precedents used by the
Supreme Court in the 2016 Hughes decision.138 On appeal, the Second
Circuit concurred that it was ripe to find the Vermont statute preempted on
one of the three federal claims and struck the statute as unconstitutional.139
C. Seventh Circuit
The Seventh Circuit rendered two recent decisions relevant to the
Constitutional separation of state and federal authority over energy regulation
under the Supremacy and Commerce Clauses of the Constitution. Judge
Richard Posner, speaking for the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in
a much-watched unanimous decision, affirmed the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission’s approval of the Midwest Independent Service Operator’s
(MISO)140 proportionate customer utility allocation of transmission costs
for transmission lines to move renewable wind power to populated areas141
under the Supremacy Clause.142 However, the court also chose to speak about
limitations of the Dormant Commerce Clause regarding the state of Michigan’s
discrimination in its application of its renewable portfolio standards.143
The Circuit relied on a law review article authored by Professor Ferrey for
its authority on the respective jurisdiction of state and federal governments to
regulate electricity.144
The Seventh Circuit, again with Judge Posner, issued a second decision
in 2016 that further decides the Constitutional debate regarding jurisdiction

137. Id. at 234.
138. See infra Section III B.
139. Entergy Nuclear Vt. Yankee, LLC v. Shumlin, 733 F.3d 393, 433 (2d Cir. 2013).
140. See Ill. Commerce Comm’n v. FERC, 721 F.3d 764, 770 (7th Cir. 2013) (noting
that MISO’s service area extends from the Canadian border, east to Michigan and parts of
Indiana, south to northern Missouri, and west to eastern areas of Montana.).
141. Id. at 772 (noting that MISO allocated the costs of the transmission projects
among all of the utilities that draw power from the MISO grid in proportion to each
utilities’ overall volume of usage; FERC approved MISO’s rate design, which led some
states to initiate court appeal.).
142. See generally id. at 773.
143. Id. at 776.
144. Id.
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to regulate,145 particularly with regard to FERC’s prohibition of state
discretionary rights-of-first-refusal (ROFRs) in ISO transmission planning.146
The Circuit Court held that an ISO operating pursuant to federal FERC
authorization, or FERC itself, alone can control wholesale generation
transactions so as to create a competitive wholesale power market:147
“No one likes to be competed against. . . . [Incumbents] don’t want to have to bid
down the prices at which they will build new facilities in order to remain
competitive. . . . [C]ontract rights are not sacred, especially when they curtail
competition.” [. . .] “[A] contract in which the parties are seeking to protect
themselves from competition from third parties (cartels are the classic example
of such contracts)” does not deserve [. . .] deference [under the Mobile-Sierra
doctrine].148

V. DISTINCT WESTERN STATE REGULATORY DISCRETION
REGARDING ENERGY
What power on energy remains within state discretion, and how does
this vary between the Western states and other states? The Supreme Court
in 2016 in the Hughes decision reiterated what has always been known to
be within state authority:
We therefore need not and do not address the permissibility of various other measures
States might employ to encourage development of new or clean generation, including
tax incentives, land grants, direct subsidies, construction of state-owned generation
facilities, or re-regulation of the energy sector. . . . [that are] ‘untethered to a generator’s
wholesale market participation.’149

There is nothing newly added in this decisional statement regarding where
traditional state energy regulatory authority extends. States have applied
state retail rates for net metering and can regulate the renewable energy
145. MISO Transmission Owners v. FERC, 819 F.3d 329, 332 (7th Cir. 2016), reh’g
denied (June 16, 2016).
146. For more on legal issues associated with FERC Order 1000 and ISO authority,
see Steven Ferrey, State Refusal Triggers Constitutional Crisis: Past is Prologue on Energy
and Infrastructure, 34 U. TEX. REV. LITIG. 423, 429–42 (2015).
147. MISO Transmission Owners v. FERC, 819 F.3d 329, 332 (7th Cir. 2016) (“an
independent system operator can coordinate the transmission system in a way that among
other things promotes competition among the producers of electrical power.”); Energy
Primer: A Handbook of Energy Market Basics, FERC 40, 47, 58–61 (Nov. 2015), https://
www.ferc.gov/market-oversight/guide/energy-primer.pdf [https://perma.cc/RV8J-PG9T];
Illinois Commerce Commission v. FERC, 721 F.3d at 769–70; MISO Transmission Owners v.
FERC, 819 F.3d at 334 (determining that the incumbent utilities were “sophisticated enough to
understand the benefits of a contract that would give each party protection against competition
in the creation of new facilities.”).
148. Scott Hempling, “Transmission Competition”: No Longer an Oxymoron, SCOTT
HEMPLING ATTORNEY AT LAW LLC (Aug. 2016), http://www.scotthemplinglaw.com/
transmission-competition [https://perma.cc/3GL5-7UWW].
149. Hughes v. Talen Energy Mktg., LLC, 136 S. Ct. 1288, 1299 (2016).
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market by providing REC incentives.150 Both net metering and Renewable
Portfolio System RECs are covered elsewhere in detail,151 however, a few
additional points are relevant.
A. Net Metering Changes in a Western State–Nevada
A Western state, Nevada, took the national lead as the first of the once
44 net metering states (recently reduced to 41 states) to restrict the value
of net metering to the wholesale value of the power without a crosssubsidy to the net metering customer. Western state Hawaii (see note 170)
also terminated new metering and Georgia also withdrew, while net metering
reforms are under consideration in Western states California152 and Arizona.153
On this change, the Western states are again leaders. Net metering nationwide
is illustrated in Figure 18.

Ferrey, supra note 6, at 17–18.
Id. at 15–22.
Ker Than, As Solar Power Grows, Dispute Flares Over U.S. Utility Bills, NAT’L
GEOGRAPHIC (Dec. 25, 2013), http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/energy/2013/12/
131226-utilities-dispute-net-metering-for-solar/ [https://perma.cc/F8JB-QQCN].
153. Steven Ferrey, Net Legal Power, 53 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 221 (2016).
150.
151.
152.
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FIGURE 18

A report to the Nevada PUC found that net metering for systems installed
between 2004 and 2016154 would provide a benefit to non-solar owners of
$36 million over the life of the systems.155 This is an extremely modest
amount—$3 million per year, in a state with high solar insolation. There
were “14,832 interconnected net metering customers at Nevada Power Co.
in Southern Nevada, and 2,423 customers with Sierra Pacific in Northern
Nevada. Both companies are part of NV Energy.”156
2015 legislation directed the Nevada Public Utilities Commission to
establish a new, separate tariff for rooftop solar customers.157 Finding that
net-metered ratepayers are “under-paying” their allocable share,158 the

154. Snuller Price et al., Nevada Net Energy Metering Impacts Evaluation, ST. OF
NEV. PUB. UTIL. COMMISSION 7–8 (July 2014), http://puc.nv.gov/uploadedFiles/pucnvgov/
Content/About/Media_Outreach/Announcements/Announcements/E3%20PUCN%20NE
M%20Report%202014.pdf [https://perma.cc/G3ZX-NWU4].
155. Nev. Power Co., 326 P.U.R.4th 199, ¶¶ 26, 31 (2015), 2015 WL 9590781.
156. Sean Whaley, Nevada net metering service charge hike announced, LAS VEGAS
REV. J. (Dec. 31, 2015), http://www.reviewjournal.com/business/energy/nevada-net-metering
service-charge-hike-announced [https://perma.cc/U2VQ-ACEG].
157. Michael Graham Richard, Sunny Nevada is killing the solar industry in the state
with new net-metering rules, TREEHUGGER (Jan. 4, 2016), http://www.treehugger.com/
environmental-policy/sunny-nevada-killing-solar-industry-state-new-net-metering-rules.
html [https://perma.cc/4458-Z3YE].
158. Nevada Power Co., 326 P.U.R.4th at ¶ 78.
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PUC allowed the Nevada utilities to create a separate rate class for ratepayers
with solar photovoltaic (PV) systems and charge those ratepayers a
substantially higher fixed fee to “address the inequity” by designing rates
specifically for those ratepayers.159 While several parties argued that the
benefits of PV should be accounted for in the rate design, the PUC
determined that utility “[r]ates are based on marginal (internal utility)
costs and do not reflect external benefits,” and that any benefits of PV are
more appropriately considered in a proceeding about resource planning.160
Distributed solar units which net meter are, as of 2016, assessed a higher
flat monthly fee than are non-net-metering customers, on an increasing
ongoing basis over time, and the buy-back rate for excess net metered
supply of power is reduced:
The base service charge is rising from $12.75 to $17.90 per month [a 40%
increase] for southern Nevada solar customers and from $15.25 to $21.09 [a
38.2% increase] for northern Nevada customers. The changes also reduce the
amount the utility pays to buy power back from rooftop solar panels, from 11
cents a kilowatt hour to 9 cents [an 18.2% decrease] in southern Nevada and from
12 cents to 10.5 cents [a 12.5% decrease] in the north. The service charge will rise and
the reimbursement will drop every year until 2020.161

The monthly service charge “will continue to ratchet up [each year],
reaching a rate of $38.51 by Jan. 1, 2020.”162 The increase is a 40 percent
increase over the prior rate for rooftop solar customers.163 The previous
credit paid by the utility and its customers for surplus net metered power
exported to the grid was approximately 11 cents/Kwh,164 and would be
reduced in steps to about 9 cents/Kwh, declining progressively over four
years to 2.6 cents/Kwh by Jan. 1, 2020.165
The retail rate for sale “of electricity in Nevada is 12.39 [cents/Kwh]; the
wholesale price for electricity in the region that includes Nevada averaged
around 2 [cents/Kwh]” at the end of 2015.166 So by 2020, Nevada will credit
surplus net metered renewable power at approximately the wholesale
159. Id. ¶ 90.
160. Id. ¶ 85.
161. Richard, supra note 157.
162. Whaley, supra note 156.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Richard Martin, Battles Over Net Metering Cloud the Future of Rooftop Solar,
MIT TECHNOLOGY REV. (Jan. 5, 2016), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/545146/
battles-over-net-metering-cloud-the-future-of-rooftop-solar/ [https://perma.cc/D5NY-WXFR].
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power rate. This is the rate that the homeowner would earn if it sold its
power as a Qualifying Facility as of right under the Public Utility Regulatory
Policies Act (PURPA) to the utility.167
Many states and the utilities that they regulate are at or near the limits
established on total solar capacity allowed to participate under their net
metering programs.168 For instance, Nevada reached its cap of 235 Mw for
its net-metering program in 2015.169 Hawaii closed its program to new
solar owners.170 Challenges to existing net metering programs are underway
in several other Western states, including California and Arizona, as well
as in other states outside the West. This is a major change to more discerning
modify net metering for customers in some of the 44 states which at one
time or another had neter metering programs.
B. How the Western States are Distinct
The Western states have also distinguished themselves for denial of
legal standing to their citizens to raise climate change-related issues or to
question state energy policy. California resisted challenge by low-income
residents to its climate control statute.171 In Alaska, an Eskimo village was
denied standing to sue twenty-four oil, energy, and utility companies for
nuisance when the arctic ice surrounding their village was melting allegedly
as a result of global warming from defendants’ greenhouse emissions.172
The court found that the plaintiff citizens were not entitled to special solicitude
because they were seeking damages directly from private entities and they
were not asserting a quasi-sovereign interest “. . . predicated on the rights a
State relinquishes to the federal government when it enters the Union.”173
Washington state contested the ability of non-profit groups to raise climaterelated issues. Environmental groups sued several Washington state agencies
under the Clean Air Act RACT provisions for failing to regulate five oil

167. See FERREY, LAW OF INDEPENDENT POWER, supra note 14, § 5:16.
168. Martin, supra note 166.
169. Benjamin Inskeep et al., The 50 States of Solar: A Quarterly Look at America’s
Fast-Evolving Distributed Solar Policy Conversation, NCCLEANTECH 9 (2015), https://
nccleantech.ncsu.edu/wp-content/uploads/50-States-of-Solar-Q3-FINAL_25.pdf [https://
perma.cc/G6YX-PNVH].
170. Mark Dyson & Jesse Morris, Hawaii Just Ended Net Metering for Solar. Now
What?, RMI BLOG (Oct. 16, 2015), http://blog.rmi.org/blog_2015_10_16_hawaii_just_ended_net_
metering_for_solar_now_what [https://perma.cc/32ZS-ZMS5].
171. Ass’n of Irritated Residents v. Cal. Air. Res. Bd., 143 Cal. Rptr.3d 65, 80 (Ct.
App. 2012).
172. In Native Village of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 663 F. Supp. 2d 863, 882
(N.D. Cal. 2009).
173. Id.
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refineries’ GHG emissions.174 The Ninth Circuit, which had supported both
California’s and Oregon’s LCFS programs, refused to grant the environmental
group standing to litigate against Washington. It held that the plaintiffs
were not entitled to special solicitude because they were not implicating a
procedural right nor were they a sovereign state.175
Notwithstanding the standing restrictions that Western states have asserted
against suits by citizens, no state is compelled to participate in a multistate
ISO. A state electing to do so shifts power from state discretion to exclusive
federal control over all wholesale power sales. FERC approves all RTO
and ISO terms of service and the financial tariffs.176 In the 2016 Hughes
matter, which was upheld unanimously by the Supreme Court, the Circuit
Court decision notes that in recent times, the role of federal regulation has
become increasingly prominent.177 The Circuit Court stressed that the state
of Maryland chose to abandon its prior state model “and throw in its lot
with the federal interstate market” effectively compelling obedient state
participation in the interstate market.178
Because there is a constitutional “bright line” between state and federal
authority, as more power sales shift to the wholesale area of exclusive federal
regulation, the application of state regulation is displaced. As shown in
Figure 17, the Western states are the largest block of states in the country
which have avoided joining any interstate ISOs. This allows them to transfer
power among themselves without using an interstate ISO, which they do
as illustrated in Figure 6.
Instead, in the Hughes matter, if Maryland had so elected not to participate
in an interstate ISO, it could have imposed state requirements as to its
utilities’ purchase of power and operation of in-state power generation
plants. However, after joining the PJM interstate ISO, once Maryland chose
to provide state incentives for in-state generation and sale of wholesale
power, it could not implement them in a manner which even indirectly
interfered with FERC’s federally-approved wholesale auctions and tariffs.
The Federal Power Act applies federal authority over these wholesale power
transactions, preempting state authority. As held by the federal court of
appeals and affirmed by the Supreme Court:
174. Wash. Env’t Council v. Bellon, 732 F.3d 1131, 1138 (9th Cir. 2013).
175. Id. at 1145.
176. FERREY, supra note 114, at 48, 50.
177. PPL EnergyPlus, LLC v. Nazarian, 753 F.3d 467, 471 (4th Cir. 2014) (citing
New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. 1, 7 (2002)).
178. Id. at 473.
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Local utilities now obtain power largely through wholesale contracts subject to
FERC’s exclusive regulation, rather than through self-generated and transmitted
power . . . Although state regulators formerly took an extremely active role so as
to ensure the just and reasonable retail power rates, FERC has exclusive jurisdiction
over the wholesale rates that now drive the electric power market and, as a practical
matter, largely determine the rates ultimately charged to the public.179

In 2014, nearly forty percent of U.S. electricity was generated by what
the U.S. Energy Information Administration designates as “independent
power producers,”180 increasing almost 400% from ten percent two decades
earlier.181 As noted by the Supreme Court in its most recent Federal Power
Act decision prior to 2016:
When combined with federal preemption law, one crucial result of these energy
market regulatory reforms has been ‘a massive shift in regulatory jurisdiction
from the states to FERC’. . . . The upshot of these federal and state innovations
in electricity regulation is that state regulators, despite their continued authority
over rates charged directly to consumers, have much less actual authority over
those rates than they did [earlier].182

Because of Western states not participating in any multi-state ISOs, and
being within the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, they can operate by a
different legal compass than most of the other states in the nation. There
is a technological shift to renewable power. Renewable energy will absorb
almost two-thirds of the spending on new power plants over the next twentyfive years, dwarfing spending on fossil fuels, as solar energy becomes the
first choice for consumers. The Western states have technological advantages,
being the only region of the country with both the best solar insolation as
well as some of the best available baseload renewable energy potential for
the power sector.

179. Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1 of Snohomish Cnty. Wash. v. FERC, 471 F.3d 1053, 1066
(9th, Cir. 2006), aff’d in part and rev’d in part sub nom; Morgan Stanley Capital Group,
Inc. v. Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1, 554 U.S. 527 (2008); see also Entergy v. Shumlin, 733 F. 3d
393, 432 (2d Cir. 2013).
180. Electric Power Monthly with Data for June 2015, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN.
tbls. 1.2, 1.3, 1.4. 1,5 (Aug. 2015), http://www.eia.gov/electricity/monthly/current_year/
august2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/59TG-H2TA].
181. Fed. Energy Reg. Comm’n Rep., Order No. 888: Promoting Wholesale
Competition Through Open Access Non-Discriminatory Transmission Services by Public
Utilities; Recovery of Stranded Costs by Public Utilities and Transmitting Utilities, 61 Fed.
Reg. 21540 (May 10, 1996) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. pts. 38, 385).
182. Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1 of Snohomish Cnty. Wash. v. FERC, 471 F.3d at 1066;
see also Entergy Nuclear Vt. Yankee, LLC v. Shumlin, 733 F.3d 393, 399, 402, 422, 432
(2nd Cir 2013).
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